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PAY OR PLAY?: WHY REQUIRING NOTICE
AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IN
CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES BEST
SERVES THE COMPLIANCE GOALS OF
TITLE IX
JULIE G. YAP*
In 2011, the University of Delaware eliminated its varsity men’s outdoor
track and field team after 100 years of intercollegiate competition.1 The
university cited “exercising fiscal responsibility and remaining in compliance
with Title IX” as the reasons for the cut. 2 However, the university did not
argue that the elimination was essential to immediate compliance with the
law. 3 Indeed, the university had been maintaining compliance through the
periodic expansion of female athletic programs and planned to add a women’s
golf team in the fall of 2011. 4 Rather, the team was eliminated out of the
university’s concern that it could not remain compliant in the future given
financial constraints. 5 In eliminating a more low-profile team, the university
joined dozens of fellow institutions that have eliminated men’s “minor” sports
teams, such as wrestling, 6 tennis, and gymnastics, purportedly because of Title
* Julie Yap is a lawyer in Washington, D.C. She served as a career law clerk in the Eastern
District of California and as an adjunct professor at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law. Special thanks to Scott P. Mallery for his continual comments and insight and to the Honorable
Frank C. Damrell, Jr. (ret.) for his thoughtful review and amazing mentorship.
1. Katie Thomas, Cutting Men’s Programs Now to Satisfy Title IX in Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2011, at D1; Kevin Tresolini, University of Delaware Drops Men’s Track, Cross Country,
DELAWARE ONLINE (Jan. 19, 2011), http://blogs.delawareonline.com/collegesports/2011/01/19/
university-of-delaware-drops-mens-track-cross-country.
2. Tresolini, supra note 1. The university also eliminated men’s cross country. Id.
3. Thomas, supra note 1.
4. Id.; Tresolini, supra note 1. In 1991, the university had eliminated men’s wrestling, and
subsequently added women’s soccer and women’s rowing. Tresolini, supra note 1.
5. Thomas, supra note 1. The university’s athletic director stated, “Continued expansion of our
athletic program is not feasible in this financial climate, and given that reality, the university made the
only decision it could.” Id.; Laura Gottesdiener, University of Delaware’s Title IX Sports Cuts:
Questions Still Linger, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05
/09/university-delaware-title-ix_n_859737.html.
6. In January 2002, the National Wrestling Coaches Association and others brought suit against
the Department of Education, claiming that Title IX results in discrimination against men because it
forces schools to cut men’s teams, such as wrestling. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S.
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However, critics of the decision, including members of the former track
and field team, question whether Title IX is unnecessarily taking the blame for
the elimination of the programs. 8 Specifically, concerns have been raised that
Title IX has become the scapegoat for funneling additional resources into the
football budget. 9 In fact, similar cuts to lower profile varsity men’s programs
have been made at other schools in the Colonial Athletic Conference, in which
the university competes; Towson University cut four men’s teams in 2004, and
James Madison University cut seven in 2006.10 Further, advocates of Title IX
assert that the law is often unfairly blamed for the misallocation of resources
to “major” men’s sports, such as football and basketball. 11
Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003). However, in the four-year period when the threepart test was not enforced, 1984–1988, “colleges and universities cut wrestling teams at a rate almost
three times as high as the rate of decline during the twelve years after Title IX’s application to
intercollegiate athletics was firmly reestablished.” Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of
Title IX: Why Current Policies Are Required to Ensure Equality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 11, 32 (2003).
7. Chelsea A. Young, Experts Reflect on Title IX’s Successes, Challenges 35 Years After Law
Enacted, STANFORD REP. (May 2, 2007), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/may2/title050207.html; Megan K. Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting
Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189, 190 (2001) (noting that the indirect result of Title IX is
that “budget restrictions force universities to reduce the number of roster spots available on men’s
athletic teams or, in the alternative, eliminate these teams completely”); Susan M. Shook, The Title IX
Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990’s: Nonrevenue Men’s Teams Join Women
Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L. J. 773, 793–96 (1996) (“[I]nstitutions facing budget
cuts realize that while downsizing their athletic programs is an economic must, they cannot respond
by lowering the participation opportunities granted to female athletes. As a result, some schools have
responded by retaining most, if not all, of their women’s varsity sports slots while cutting back on
their men’s teams.”); see Dennis Dodd, Football Needs to Start Making Title IX Sacrifices,
CBSSPORTS.COM (June 12, 2002), http://www.cbssports.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,5427007,
00.html (noting that hundreds of men’s programs have been cut in order to free up scholarships for
new women’s programs).
8. Gottesdiener, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Numerous Title IX experts and commentators posit that the problem is not that Title IX takes
resources away from men’s sports, but that resources are misallocated among men’s sports with the
majority of resources distributed to men’s football and basketball teams. Title IX and Men’s “Minor”
Sports: A False Conflict, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER (July 2008), at 1, available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Men’s%20Minor%20Sports%20Final.pdf
[hereinafter
Title IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports]; see also Dodd, supra note 7 (noting that none of the 117 I-A
programs have cut a single football scholarship in order to gain compliance with Title IX); Graham
Watson, Title IX Puts Schools in Conundrum, ESPN (July 14, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com
/ncaa/news/story?id=4326021 (noting that 75–78% of Division I men’s athletic budget is spent on
men’s basketball and football). However, critics of Title IX point to the revenue generating disparity
between men’s and women’s athletic programs. Id. In the 2007–2008 academic year, the median
NCAA Division I men’s program generated $22.2 million in revenue, $19.6 million of which was
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At the core of this controversy is one thing. Money.
Title IX was landmark legislation that changed the educational and athletic
opportunities available to women. 12 Its purposes were considered
revolutionary at the time it was enacted and continue to serve a vital service in
educational equality among men and women to this day. 13 In a world of
limitless resources, no one would seriously debate the importance of providing
gender equity to women in the provision of athletic opportunities.
However, this is not a world of limitless resources.
The debate over Title IX is driven by the allocation of finite athletic
department budgets. It requires tough choices between men’s programs that
have been around for decades (or even a century), 14 programs that produce
thousands (if not millions) in revenue, 15 and programs that give a class of
historically underrepresented students an opportunity to compete. Critics of
Title IX assert that the former should not necessarily be sacrificed by the
latter. 16
attributable to men’s football and basketball, while the median women’s program generated
$865,000. Id.
12. In 1974, nationwide, 50,000 men attended college on athletic scholarships, compared to
fewer than 50 women. Twenty-five years later, well over 100,000 women participated in varsity
sports at member institutions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Lee Sigelman
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, Gender Proportionality in Intercollegiate Athletics: The Mathematics of Title IX
Compliance, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 518, 519 (1999) (citing Hearing on Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 Before the H. Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training, and Life-Long
Learning of the H. Comm. on Economic and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong., 104–31, 138–77
(1995) (statement by Normal Cantu, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.).
13. Moreover, the work of Title IX is far from over. At the thirty-year anniversary of the
enactment of Title IX, women’s athletic programs continued to lag behind men’s athletic programs in
participation opportunities, athletic scholarships, operating budgets, and recruiting expenditures. Title
IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports: A False Conflict, supra note 11, at 1. “For example, women in
Division I colleges, while representing 53% of the student body, receive only 44% of the participation
opportunities, 37% of the total money spent on athletics, 45% of the total athletic scholarship dollars,
and 32% of recruiting dollars.” Id. (citing NCAA, 2003–04 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT
(September 2006), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/GERONLINE.
pdf).
14. See Thomas, supra note 1.
15. See Gottesdiener, supra note 5 (noting that, in 2010, the University of Delaware’s football
team netted just under one million dollars).
16. Some legal and policy scholars have called for the repeal or, at minimum, reworking of Title
IX based on, inter alia, the law’s failure to take into account the costs of providing particular athletic
opportunities, the revenue generated by certain sports, and the inflexible proportionality requirement.
Richard
A.
Epstein,
Repeal
Title
IX,
DEFINING
IDEAS
(May
4,
2011),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/77231 (“Congress should junk Title IX in
its entirety as a failed experiment in government intervention.”); see also Allison Kasic, Title IX and
Athletics: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives and Unintended Consequences, INDEP. WOMEN’S
FORUM, June 2010, at 9, available at http://www.iwf.org/files/8fc3dc20d277ff96968266aaab0add0a.
pdf (“[T]he development and current enforcement of Title IX policies have succeeded only in
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But, what if these already limited budgets were further depleted in the
name of Title IX? What if female students, some of whom may have the
desire but not the ability to compete at a collegiate varsity level, were given a
payout for a school’s unanticipated or unintentional failure to comply with
Title IX? What if those female students do not even attend the institution
anymore? What if these female students bring suit in the form of a class
action that eventually results in damages that exceed an entire athletic
department’s budget? How will advocates of Title IX defend such a result?
Litigation surrounding the effective accommodation of athletic
opportunities for women has been sparse, and most has involved claims for
injunctive relief, seeking the actual addition of more athletic opportunities for
women at the collegiate level. Recently, though, a split among circuits has
emerged with respect to claims for money damages arising out of the alleged
ineffective accommodation of female student-athletes. While one circuit has
concluded that an institution must be given notice and an opportunity to cure
this type of alleged violation,17 two circuits have concluded that because
institutional decisions regarding athletic programs are always intentional,
notice and an opportunity to cure are not required.18
This article asserts that, where money damages are sought: (1) notice and
an opportunity to cure alleged claims of ineffective accommodation is
consistent with the statutory scheme enacted by Congress; and (2) failure to
require such notice ignores precedent relating to the appropriate interpretation
of legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under the Spending
Clause. Moreover, failure to require notice and an opportunity to cure in
claims for money damages undermines the flexible application and evenhanded enforcement mechanisms of the statute. Finally, allowing individuals
to sue for money damages without notice and an opportunity to cure may
likely lead to further criticism of the statute, particularly in times of fiscal
distress for many educational institutions.19
replacing one form of discrimination with another.”); Neal McCluskey, UConn’s Streak and Title IX,
CATO INST. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/uconns-streak-and-title-ix/ (arguing that
Title IX does not reflect “the reality . . . that women might just not want to play sports as fervently as
men”). Moreover, the American Sports Council, previously the College Sports Council, recently filed
suit against the Department of Education, alleging that the use of gender quotas to enforce Title IX in
high school athletic programs violates the Equal Protection Clause. Complaint, Am. Sports Council
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-1347, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41233 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2012).
17. Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 2001).
18. Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
19. Watson, supra note 11 (noting that maintaining gender equity and Title IX compliance in
both athletic opportunities and scholarships has become even more difficult during the economic
downturn).
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Conversely, such notice is not needed when a party brings suit to actually
end or prevent a discriminatory practice or policy, because a suit purely for
injunctive and declaratory relief does not implicate the countervailing policy
concern of ensuring that funds are optimally devoted to the provision of equal
educational and athletic opportunities. Indeed, unlike suits for money
damages, suits for equitable relief further the primary focus of Title IX—
protecting individuals from discriminatory practices.20
Part I describes the evolution of the private right of action under Title IX,
including the Spending Clause principles that influence its statutory
interpretation and the scope of the rights and remedies available. Part II
examines the current split among the circuits regarding whether notice and an
opportunity to cure is required in suits for money damages arising out of
challenges to an institution’s athletic program. Part III proposes that notice
and an opportunity to cure is required in such cases in order to comply with
both statutory interpretation and sound policy.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX FOR
MONEY DAMAGES

Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . 21
“Congress enacted Title IX in response to its finding—after extensive
hearings held in 1970 by the House Special Subcommittee on Education—of
pervasive discrimination against women with respect to educational
opportunities.” 22 In enacting Title IX, Congress “sought to accomplish two
20. This Article does not advocate for the imposition of a notice and opportunity to cure
requirement when a party brings suit to actually end or prevent a discriminatory practice or policy.
Furthermore, this Article does not advocate for restrictions on whom is an appropriate person to give
notice or what type of notice is required. The Article simply asserts that some actual notice and
opportunity to cure should be required before allowing a plaintiff to sue for money damages under
Title IX.
21. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2011).
22. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir.1996) [hereinafter Cohen II]. Title IX
addressed a perceived gap created by Title VI, which prohibits race discrimination by institutions that
receive federal funding, and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment on a variety of
bases, including sex. David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment
Sex Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2004). Neither Title VI
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related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives.”23 Specifically,
Congress sought “to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices.” 24 Title IX anticipated institutional
compliance by 1978. 25
Title IX’s coverage extends, with few exceptions, to educational
institutions—including colleges, universities, elementary and secondary
institutions, and training programs—that receive federal funding. 26 Because
federal financial assistance takes many forms, both direct and indirect,27 “in
practice, [Title IX reaches] the vast majority of accredited colleges and
universities.” 28 Where Title IX applies, it guarantees equal opportunity in all
aspects of the education program, including admissions, treatment of
participants, and employment. 29
A. Evolution of Title IX and Implementing Regulations
After Title IX was first enacted in 1972, the breadth of Title IX’s
application was unclear, particularly with regard to whether the statute’s
requirements applied to athletic programs. 30 Indeed, the inclusion of athletic
programs generally, and football specifically, was debated prior to enactment.
Attempts by Congress to exclude “revenue producing” sports, such as football,
were defeated or otherwise died in committee.31
In 1974, Congress sought to resolve the lack of clarity by directing the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to draft implementing

nor Title VII, however, prohibits sex discrimination in education. Id. at 318.
23. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
24. Id.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL (2001), available at http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/cor/coord/ixlegal.php.
27. The Supreme Court has expressly held that “[t]here is no basis in the statute for the view that
only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the federal
government are subject to regulation.” Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984). “The
economic effect of direct and indirect assistance is often indistinguishable.” Id. at 565.
28. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cohen I]. The most
common funding sources for colleges and universities are federal student loans, federal work-study
dollars, and federal research grants. Janet P. Judge, Title IX and Its Application to Intercollegiate
Athletics, in PRACTICAL INSIGHT ON NATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING HIGHER EDUCATION § 11.2
(Robert W. Iuliano ed., 2009); see generally Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 563–69.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26.
30. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1.
31. Id.
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regulations that included direction to intercollegiate athletic programs. 32 In
1975, the HEW 33 issued its first set of implementing regulations to Title IX.34
The regulations generally provide:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis. 35
With respect to intercollegiate athletics, the regulations more specifically
provide that “[a] recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes.”36 This provision guarantees equality
in both the provision of athletic opportunities—”effective accommodation”—
and the treatment as student-athletes 37—”equal treatment.” 38 The effective
accommodation component is set forth in 34 C.F.R. section 106.41(c); it
requires consideration of “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of

32. Id.
33. In 1979, the HEW was divided into the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and the Department of Education (DOE). Dep’t of Educ. Org. Act, Pub. L. No 96-88 (1979). The
DOE, acting through the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is the current agency responsible for
administering and ensuring compliance with Title IX. When the HEW was divided into the HHS and
the DOE, “the existing regulations were left within HHS’s arsenal while, at the same time, [DOE]
replicated them as part of its own regulatory armamentarium.” Cohen I, 99 F.2d at 895. For purposes
of clarity, the article cites only to the DOE regulations, found at 34 C.F.R. § 106.
34. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895.
35. Athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2011).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
37. Equal treatment of student-athletes requires that educational institutions (1) “allocate athletic
scholarship dollars equitably;” and (2) “treat male and female students equitably in all respects of
athletics, including with regard to equipment and supplies; locker rooms, facilities, and practice areas;
scheduling of games and practices; medical and training services; publicity; and assignment and
compensation of coaches.” Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 13. While this Article discusses only
the first component—equal athletic participation opportunities—the same principles apply with
almost equal force to claims brought for a violation of the equal treatment components of Title IX.
Accordingly, while this Article does not expressly address such claims, as set forth, infra, notice and
an opportunity to cure should similarly be a prerequisite to suits for money damages brought under an
equal treatment theory.
38. Id. While these prohibitions bear equal weight in determining whether an institution is Title
IX compliant, “in practice, participation opportunities are primus inter pares in deciding whether a
school is compliant with Title IX.” Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 520.
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both sexes.” 39 At its core, the effective accommodation component is
concerned with the availability of equal opportunities for female studentathletes to participate in athletics.
With respect to measuring effective accommodation, Title IX expressly
provides that statistical evidence of an imbalance between the percentage of
persons of a certain sex at an institution receiving federal funds and the
percentage of persons of that sex in any community by itself is insufficient “to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex.” 40 However, such an imbalance can be considered
in evaluating whether equal accommodation has been provided.41
As a result of the ambiguity in how to consider proportional imbalances
and “in response to numerous complaints alleging Title IX violations with
regard to discrimination in athletics,” in 1979 “the HEW issued a policy
interpretation explaining the ways in which institutions may effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of their student-athletes.” 42 The
policy interpretation (1979 Interpretation) sets forth the “three-part test” for
measuring compliance with Title IX. 43 Under this test, a university may
demonstrate compliance in one of three ways: by showing that (1)
“intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments”; 44 or (2) the institution has “a history and continuing practice of
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). The equal treatment component derives from 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c)(2)–(10), which requires equality in (1) provision of equipment and supplies, (2) scheduling
of games and practice time, (3) travel and per diem allowance, (4) opportunities to receive coaching
and academic tutoring, (5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors, (6) provision of
locker rooms, practice, and competitive facilities, (7) provision of medical and training facilities and
services, (8) provision of housing and dining facilities and services, and (8) publicity.
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
41. Id.
42. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:03-cv-2591, 2011 WL 3364887, at *45
(E.D. Cal., Aug. 3, 2011); A Policy Interpretation, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, OFFICE FOR
CIV. RIGHTS, DEP’T OF EDUC., 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979), available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (hereinafter 1979 Policy Interpretation].
The 1979 Interpretation delineates three general areas in which institutional compliance with the
effective accommodation section of the regulation is assessed” – (1) the determination of athletic
interests and abilities of students; (2) the selection of sports offered; and (3) the levels of competition
available including the opportunity for team competition. Id.; Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993).
43. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42. The 1979 Interpretation was effective on its face
December 11, 1979. However, it was never submitted to the President for approval, and thus, does
not have the binding effect of rule, regulations, or orders authorized by 20 U.S.C. § 1682. See
Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) rev’d on other grounds, 213 F.3d 858
(5th Cir. 2000).
44. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42. The first prong of the three-part test “effectively
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program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities of the members” of the historically underrepresented
sex; 45 or (3) “the interests and abilities of the members of [the historically
underrepresented sex] 46 have been fully and effectively accommodated 47 by
the present program.” 48
However, between 1984 and 1988, institutions once again faced
uncertainty regarding whether Title IX required equal opportunities in athletic
programs. In 1984, in Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that
Title IX’s compliance requirements were program specific. 49 The fact that
federal funds might eventually reach an institution’s general operating budget
could not subject the entire institution to Title IX’s requirement; rather the
“program or activity” that received federal assistance is the only “program or
activity” regulated under Title IX.50
provides that if every female student has the same chances of participating in athletics as every male
student, then the school will be found to be providing equal athletic participation opportunities.”
Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 15.
45. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42. The second prong of the three-part test focuses on
incremental progress toward equality, “an exceptionally and atypically generous standard for
measuring civil rights compliance.” Id.
46. While the regulations refer generally to the “historically underrepresented sex,” this Article
refers specifically to women and female student-athletes as the intended beneficiaries of Title IX’s
protections. The author is aware of no cases challenging an educational institution’s athletic program
under Title IX on the basis that male students are not offered substantially proportionate athletic
opportunities relative to their enrollment.
47. The third prong of the three-part test is satisfied if female students are not interested in
additional opportunities to participate in athletics. “In practice, the third prong often constitutes a
significant ‘chicken and egg’ barrier for female athletes” due to a history of barriers, social and
institutional, that impeded female interest, ability, and participation. Samuel & Galles, supra note 6,
at 15–16. “Fundamentally, the problem with an interest-based test for allocation of participation
opportunities lies in the fact that women’s lower rate of participation in athletics reflects women’s
historical lack of opportunities to participate in sports—not lack of interest, which evolves as a
function of opportunity and experience.” Id. at 29 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
48. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42. “Critics insist, and many defenders concede, that
the real issue is proportionality, not program expansion or full accommodation.” Sigelman &
Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 521. While proportionality is only one means of demonstrating
compliance with Title IX, “compliance in the foreseeable future with either the second or third prong
of the participation requirement is widely dismissed as a pipe dream” because cost cutting, as opposed
to program expansion, has been the trend. Id. Many critics assert that proportionality is not a fair or
accurate measurement for gender equality in intercollegiate activity. Id.
49. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 571–74.
50. Id. In Grove City College, the petitioner was a private, coeducational, liberal arts college that
consistently refused both state and federal financial assistance in order to preserve its institutional
autonomy. Id. at 559. However, the institution enrolled a large number of students who received
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) pursuant to the DOE’s Alternate Disbursement
System. Id. As a result, the DOE concluded that the college was a “recipient” of “Federal financial
assistance” under Title IX and requested that the college execute an “Assurance of Compliance”
required under the applicable regulations. Id. at 560. Despite rejecting the petitioner’s argument that
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In response, in 1988, Congress reinstated an institution-wide application
of Title IX by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 51 Under the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, if any facet of an educational institution receives
federal funds, the entire institution must comply with Title IX’s
requirements. 52 In an attempt to better monitor, and thus, ensure such
compliance, 53 in 1994, Congress passed the Equity in Athletics Disclosure
Act (EADA), which imposes an annual reporting requirement for colleges and
universities that have separate athletic programs for men and women. 54 The
statute requires federally funded higher education institutions to disclose (1)
the number of undergraduates and athletes, divided by gender; (2) certain
financial information regarding athletic departments, including the money
spent on athletic scholarships; (3) graduation rate of student-athletes broken
down by race and gender; and (4) the gender of coaches. 55
Subsequently, in 1996, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) published a
clarification (the “1996 Clarification”) of the three-part test for effective
accommodation. The 1996 Clarification was preceded by a letter from Norma
V. Cantu, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, which emphasized the case
specific nature of the Title IX analysis for effective accommodation claims.56
Specifically, Cantu noted, “the Clarification does not provide strict numerical
formulas or ‘cookie cutter’ answers to the issues that are inherently case- and
fact-specific.” 57 Cantu further explained that “Title IX provides institutions
with flexibility and choice regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory
it was not required to comply with Title IX because it did not directly receive financial assistance, the
Court held that the college was only required to comply with Title IX in the administration of its
student financial aid program because that was the program receiving indirect federal financial
assistance through the BEOGs. Id. at 574–75. In so holding, the Court rejected arguments that the
entire institution could be subject to Title IX requirements simply because (1) federal assistance in
one area may allow diversion of funds to other areas, or (2) federal assistance could potentially be
used to provide a variety of services to the students through whom the funds pass. Id. at 573.
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687; Civ. Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L 100-259 § 2 (1988).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1687. The Act provides, in relevant part, “For purposes of this chapter, the term
‘program or activity’ and ‘program’ mean all the operation of . . . a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education, . . . any part of which is extended
Heckman Federal financial assistance.” Id.
53. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REV. 329, 371–72 (1996).
54. Cleary Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2011).
55. Id.; Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968; Diane Heckman, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics
Action Not Involving Sexual Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175, 214–15 (2003).
56. Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 16,
1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter 1996
Clarification].
57. Id.
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participation opportunities” and that an attempt to set forth strict numerical
formulas or rigid answers would “deprive institutions of the flexibility to
which they are entitled when deciding how best to comply with the law.”58
However, the 1996 Clarification “provides specific factors that guide an
analysis of each part of the three-part test” and includes examples “to
demonstrate, in concrete terms, how these factors will be considered.”59
In 2003, OCR issued a “Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance (2003 Clarification).” 60 The
2003 Clarification noted that Title IX does not require cutting or reduction of
teams; indeed such a practice is disfavored.61 It also noted that OCR will
“aggressively enforce Title IX standards, including implementing sanctions for
institutions that do not comply,” 62 but that it will also work with schools to
achieve compliance and avoid such sanctions.63
B. Administrative Remedial Scheme
The express statutory means of enforcement of Title IX are purely
administrative. 64 Title IX directs each federal department and agency
empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any education program or
activity to establish requirements to effectuate the nondiscriminatory mandate
of the statute. 65 In 1980, the DOE added a compliance requirement to Title
IX’s implementing regulations.66 Under this requirement, each recipient of
federal funds must execute a compliance agreement with the federal

58. Id.
59. Id.; see also Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *46. The 1996 Clarification also expressly
noted that schools are permitted, though not encouraged, to meet proportionality standards by
reducing athletic opportunities for men. 1996 Clarification, supra note 56; Samuels & Galles, supra
note 6, at 17.
60. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Further Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9
guidanceFinal.html. [hereinafter 2003 Clarification].
61. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1.
62. 2003 Clarification, supra note 60.
63. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1. In 2010, the OCR issued another clarification letter, discussing
compliance under prong three of the three-part test. The letter also withdrew the clarification letter
relating to this prong that was issued in 2005. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights,
Dear Colleague Letter: Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Clarification: The Three-Part Test – Part
Three, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2010), at 1 available at http://ed.
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20100420.html.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1682; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1998).
66. Assurance Required, 34 C.F.R. 106.4 (1980).
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government, indicating that the educational institution is not discriminating on
the basis of sex in its programs and activities. 67 Title IX further provides that
compliance may be enforced by any means authorized by law, including the
“termination of or refusal to grant or continue assistance” after the opportunity
for a hearing and an express finding of noncompliance. 68
An individual seeking redress for a Title IX violation can utilize the
internal grievance process that every educational institution receiving federal
funds is required to have. 69 She may also file an administrative complaint
with the OCR within the DOE, which would trigger an investigation into the
allegations. 70 Such an investigation is not necessarily limited to the specific
program area raised in the complaint. 71 Rather, “if during the investigation
there is evidence to suggest that a disparity in a program component being
investigated is the result of an apparent disparity in another program
component that is not being investigated, then that program [area] should be
investigated.” 72 Moreover, the OCR may unilaterally choose to investigate
whether an institution is in compliance. 73 If after investigation the OCR
concludes that an institution has violated Title IX, it may terminate federal
funding to the institution or institute other lawful proceedings. 74
Significantly, however, the DOE may not initiate any enforcement
proceedings, including the termination of funding, until it “has advised the
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement
and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”75
67. Id. (“Every application for Federal financial assistance shall as condition of its approval
contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the
Assistant Secretary, that the education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and
to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.”); Heckman, supra note 55, at
210–11.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
69. Designation of Responsible Employee and Adoption of Grievance Procedures, 34 C.F.R.
106.8(b) (“A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and
equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be
prohibited by this part.”); Heckman, supra note 55, at 216.
70. Conduct of Investigations, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b); Heckman, supra note 55 at 216.
71. Heckman, supra note 55, at 216.
72. Id. at 217 (citing DIANE HECKMAN, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT ON TITLE IX,
ATHLETICS AND THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: AN EXAMINATION OF LETTERS OF FINDINGS
ISSUED BY THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE POST-RESTORATION ACT ERA 206 n.99 (1997)).
73. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7; Heckman, supra note 55, at 216. Historically, the OCR has chosen not to
conduct a significant number of these periodic compliance reviews. Heckman, supra note 55, at 216–
17.
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The complainant would not be able to obtain money damages for any
violations. Heckman, supra note 55, at 217.
75. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1). A settlement, called a compliance plan, between the institution and
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Similarly, the administrative regulations require resolution of compliance
issues “by informal means whenever possible,”76 and prohibit enforcement
proceedings absent a showing the aid recipient “has been notified of its failure
to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”77 Thus, both
the statute and its implementing regulations condition enforcement
proceedings on notice and an opportunity to cure noncompliance.
C. Private Right of Action
Title IX does not include an express private right of action in the language
of the statute. Furthermore, the statute was enacted pursuant to Congress’
authority under the Spending Clause. 78 Accordingly, in determining whether
a private right of action exists and interpreting the scope of such a right, courts
must look to both the congressional intent underlying the statute as well as the
scope of Congress’ power in enacting the statute.
1. Implied Private Rights of Action and the Spending Clause
In determining whether a private right of action can be inferred from a
federal statute, the Court looks to statutory construction,79 the focal point of
which is Congress’ intent in interpreting the statute.80 In Cort v. Ash, the
Court enumerated four factors relevant to determining whether a private
remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one: 81 (1) “whether the
statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member;” 82 (2) whether the legislative history indicates congressional intent to
provide such a remedy; 83 (3) whether a private remedy would frustrate the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme; 84 and (4) “whether implying a
federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area
basically of concern to the States.”85 This more restrictive analysis was a
departure from the Court’s previous emphasis on the desirability of implying
private rights of action in order to provide remedies that might better
the OCR may be reached without the complainant’s acquiescence. Heckman, supra note 55, at 217.
76. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1).
77. Procedure for Effecting Compliance, 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(d)(2).
78. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
79. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
80. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
81. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975).
82. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689.
83. Id. at 694.
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id. at 708.

YAP (DO NOT DELETE)

530

5/8/2012 3:38 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

effectuate the purposes of a given statute.86
The Court subsequently clarified that despite the relevance of the four
Cort factors, the dispositive question is whether Congress intended to create a
private remedy; 87 indeed, the first three Cort factors are those traditionally
relied upon by the Court in determining legislative intent.88 As such, the
touchstone for determining whether an implied right of action can be inferred
from a federal statute is Congressional intent to create one based upon the
statute, beginning with the language itself. 89 The other factors may serve to
further support a conclusion that Congress intended such a remedy, especially
where the language itself is ambiguous. 90
When interpreting rights and available remedies in legislation enacted
pursuant to Congress’ power under the Spending Clause, 91 the Court has been
particularly cautious in finding implied rights and remedies. 92 Typically, the
remedy for state noncompliance with conditions imposed by federal Spending
Clause legislation is action by the federal government to withdraw or
terminate federal funding. 93 However, to the extent that an implied right of
action is available, the Court has analogized the benefits and obligations to
those in the nature of a contract: “in return for federal funds, the recipients
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” 94 As such, akin to basic
contract law principles that require offer and acceptance, “the legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power rests on whether the
[recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”95
The Court has applied this contract law analogy in determining the scope of

86. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”).
87. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
88. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575–76.
89. Id. at 568. The Court has also noted that “intent may appear implicitly in the language or
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.” Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179
(quoting Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18).
90. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (“We have never accorded dispositive
weight to context shorn of text. In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in
interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text. We therefore
begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’ intent with the text and structure of Title
VI.”) (internal citations omitted).
91. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
92. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2002).
93. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981). In the twenty years
following its decision in Pennhurst, the Court has only twice found that Spending Clause legislation
gave rise to enforceable rights. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002).
94. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186.
95. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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conduct for which a funding recipient may be liable, 96 the remedies
available, 97 and the scope of such remedies. 98 Accordingly, a recipient of
federal funds may be liable only for conduct that violated the clear terms of
the statute and may be subjected only to remedies that it had notice of.99 With
respect to available remedies, “[a] funding recipient is generally on notice that
it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach
of contract,” such as compensatory damages and injunctive relief.100
2. Private Right of Action under Title IX
The plain text of Title IX does not provide for a private enforcement
scheme. However, in 1972, the Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago
that Congress intended to create a cause of action in favor of private victims of
discrimination. In Cannon, the plaintiff alleged that her applications for
admission to medical school were denied by the defendants, whose education
programs were receiving federal financial assistance, because she was a
woman. 101 The Court analyzed the four factors set forth in Cort to determine
whether Congress intended to provide a remedy to a special class of
litigants. 102
With respect to the first Cort factor, the Court held that it weighed in favor
of inferring a private remedy because the plain language of the statute
expressly identified a distinct class to be benefitted by the legislation. 103 The
Court reasoned that
[t]here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in
favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting
Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class,
had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by
recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the
disbursement of public funds to educational institutions

96. Id.; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999).
97. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75.
98. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187.
99. Id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 640; Franklin, 503 U.S. 60, 74–75.
100. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187 (holding that punitive damages were not available because such
damages are generally not available for breach of contract).
101. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
102. Cort, 422 U.S. 66.
103. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693–94.
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engaged in discriminatory practices.104
With respect to the second Cort factor, the Court held that it had “no doubt
that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those
available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an
implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited
discrimination.” 105 The Court noted that Title VI and Title IX use nearly
identical language to describe the benefitted class and that both statutes
provide the same administrative mechanism for terminating federal financial
support for institutions engaged in prohibited discrimination.106 Further, the
Court reasoned that representatives must have been aware that at least one
federal court of appeals and a dozen federal district courts had concluded that
Title VI created a private remedy and that the parallel constructions reflected
an intent to create a similar private remedy with respect to Title IX. 107
With respect to the third Cort factor, the Court held that a private remedy
would further, not hinder, the dual purposes of Title IX, namely to avoid the
use of federal funds at institutions that support sex discrimination and to
provide individual citizens effective relief against such practices. Specifically,
the Court reasoned that while the first purpose is served by the statutory
procedure for terminating federal funding, such a remedy is “severe and often
may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second purpose if
merely an isolated violation has occurred.” 108 The Court also noted that it
would make little sense to require that an individual prove that an institution’s
discriminatory practices are so pervasive to warrant the complete termination

104. Id. at 690–93. The Court observed that “a statute declarative of a civil right will almost
have to be stated in terms of the benefitted class . . . because the right to be free of discrimination is a
‘personal’ one . . . .” Id. at 690 n.13. As such, and unlike statutes benefitting the public at large, “a
statute conferring such a right will almost have to be phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.” Id.
Indeed, the Court also noted that Congress passed over an alternative proposal that was phrased as a
directive to the Secretary of HEW not to make any disbursement of federal funds to an institution that
discriminates on the basis of sex. Id. at 693 n.14.
105. Id. at 703.
106. Id. at 695–96.
107. Id. at 696–98.
108. Id. at 705. Indeed, Congress noted the severity of the termination of federal funding,
describing it as a last resort, “all else—including ‘lawsuits’—failing.” Id. at 705 n.38 (citing 110
Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff)). One of the dissents, however, notes that the
drastic nature of this ultimate remedy does not evidence congressional intent to allow a private
remedy. “Rather, Congress considered termination of financial assistance to be a remedy of last
resort, and expressly obligated federal agencies to take measures to terminate discrimination without
resorting to termination of funding.” Cannon, 441 U.S. at 719–20 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent
also notes that the reference to litigation in the legislative history referred to suits against public
institutions, not an expanded private remedy. Id. at 727 (White, J., dissenting).
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of federal funds when such a plaintiff seeks only enforcement of a statute in a
particular case. 109 Rather, “In that situation, the violation might be remedied
more efficiently by an order requiring an institution to accept an applicant who
had been improperly excluded.” 110 Moreover, the Court observed that while
excerpts of the legislative history expressed concern with the procedure for
terminating federal funding, none of the excerpts evidenced “any hostility
toward an implied private remedy to terminate the offending
discrimination.” 111
Finally, the Court concluded that the fourth Cort factor also weighed in
favor of a private right of action because the expenditure of federal funds
justified the particular statutory prohibition. As such, a federal private right of
action did not intrude upon an area principally of state concern.
Accordingly, the Court held that all four Cort factors supported the
inference that Congress intended to provide a private right of action in Title
IX. The Court rejected the argument that the risk of litigation would inhibit
university administrators’ ability to independently and professionally
discharge important responsibilities, noting that “[w]hatever disruption of the
academic community may accompany an occasional individual suit seeking
admission is dwarfed by the relief expressly contemplated by the statute.”112
As such, the Court concluded that “[n]ot only the words and history of Title
IX, but also its subject matter and underlying purposes, counsel implication of
a cause of action in favor of private victims of discrimination.”113
In 1986, Congress validated the Court’s holding in Cannon with the
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986. 114 The statute
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under various civil rights
legislation, including Title IX, expressly noting that “remedies (including
remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the
109. Id. at 705–06.
110. Id. at 705. The Court also cited to legislative history of Title VI that acknowledged the
existence of and need for less drastic remedies than full termination of federal funds. Id. at 705 n.38.
Personally, I think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut off. In most
cases, alternative remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination, would be the
preferable and more effective remedy. If a Negro child were kept out of a school
receiving Federal funds, I think it would be better to get the Negro child into school than
to cut off funds and impair the education of the white children.

Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff)).
111. Id. at 711.
112. Id. at 710 n.44.
113. Id. at 709.
114. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-7 (2011)); see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.
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same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit
against any public or private entity other than a State.”115
Subsequently, in 1992, the Court expressly held that money damages were
an available remedy for intentional violations of Title IX. 116 In Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, the plaintiff brought a Title IX suit arising
out of allegations that a teacher subjected the plaintiff to continual sexual
harassment while a student, and that despite awareness and an investigation of
the situation, teachers and administrators took no action and indeed
discouraged the plaintiff from pressing charges.117 The Court noted the
general presumption that all appropriate remedies are available unless
Congress expressly indicates to the contrary and that “[s]ince the Court in
Cannon concluded that this statute supported no express right of action, it is
hardly surprising that Congress also said nothing about the applicable
remedies for an implied right of action.” 118 Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that remedies were limited for both intentional and unintentional
violations to the extent Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Spending
Clause power; rather, the Court noted that the presumption against money
damages applied only to unintentional violations because “the receiving entity
of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.”119
Accordingly, because the case presented claims for only intentional
discrimination, the Court concluded that petitioner could sue under Title IX
for monetary damages. 120
D. Notice and Opportunity to Cure
Despite the widespread connotation of Title IX with gender equality in
athletic opportunities, there are only a handful of lawsuits that interpret the
provisions relating to effective accommodation or equal treatment of women
in athletics under Title IX. 121 Rather, the majority of substantive Title IX
litigation before the lower courts, and the only ones to make it before the
Supreme Court arise from allegations of sexual discrimination, sexual
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2).
116. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
117. Id. at 63–64
118. Id. at 66, 71. The concurrence noted its view that “when rights of action are judicially
‘implied,’ categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially implied as well.” Id. at
77 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, the concurrence concluded that a judicially implied exclusion of
damages under Title IX would be inappropriate in light of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1986. Id. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 74.
120. Id. at 76.
121. Cohen, supra note 22, at 312–13.
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harassment, or related retaliation.122 Indeed, it was within the context of a
sexual harassment case that the Supreme Court introduced a notice
requirement into the Title IX liability analysis.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Court first
addressed the contours and limits of a private right of action for monetary
damages under Title IX. 123 In Gebser, a high school student brought suit
against her teacher and the school district as a result of the teacher’s initiation
of a sexual relationship. 124 The student did not report the relationship to
school officials, and there was no evidence that the school district had actual
or constructive notice that the teacher was involved in a sexual relationship
with a student. 125 The Court affirmed the dismissal of the student’s Title IX
claim against the school district, holding that damages may not be recovered
“unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is
deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.” 126
In reaching this holding, the Court emphasized that “[b]ecause the private
right of action under Title IX is judicially implied, we have a measure of
latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the
statute.” 127 In determining the scope of the available remedies, the Court
examined Title IX to ensure that it fashioned the scope of the implied right “in
a manner [not] at odds with the statutory structure and purpose.” 128
Specifically, the Court noted that, unlike other civil rights statutes that focus
on compensating victims of discrimination, “Title IX focuses more on
‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients
of federal funds.” 129 Furthermore, the structure of Title IX, which is
essentially a contract between the government and the recipients of federal
funds, 130 prompted the Court to closely examine “the propriety of private
actions holding the recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance

122. Id. at 313; see Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
123. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
124. Id. at 277–78.
125. Id. at 278–79.
126. Id. at 277.
127. Id. at 284.
128. Id. at 284.
129. Id. at 287 (noting that the Court first recognized an implied right of action under Title IX in
a claim for injunctive or equitable relief).
130. Id. at 286 (explaining that, like Title VII, Title IX conditions “an offer of federal funding on
a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds.”).
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with the condition” 131 in order to ensure “‘that the receiving entity of federal
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.’” 132
Finally, and “[m]ost significantly,” the Court placed weight on the express
notice requirement and remedial scheme set forth in the statute and
implementing regulations.133 Under the statute, an agency may not initiate
enforcement proceedings until it “has advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.” 134 Similarly, the
implementing regulations require resolution of compliance issues “by informal
means whenever possible” 135 and prohibit the termination of or refusal to
grant or continue federal financial assistance until the recipient has been
advised of the failure to comply, the agency has determined that voluntary
compliance is unobtainable, and an express finding of noncompliance is made
after an opportunity for hearing. 136 Further, no other lawfully authorized
action to effect compliance can be taken until the agency has determined that
voluntary compliance is unobtainable and the recipient “has been notified of
its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”137
Where a violation is found, the regulations provide that a funding recipient
may be required to take the remedial action deemed “necessary to overcome
the effects of such discrimination.”138 However, while such remedial action
may provide equitable relief to a specific victim, 139 “the regulations do not
appear to contemplate a condition ordering payment of monetary damages,
and there is no indication that payment of damages has been demanded as a
condition of finding a recipient to be in compliance with the statute.” 140
The Court presumed that a central purpose of the administrative notice and
opportunity to cure mechanisms was “to avoid diverting education funding
from beneficial uses where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its

131. Id. at 287.
132. Id. (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74).
133. Id. at 288–89.
134. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(2).
135. 34 C.F.R. 100.7(d) (“If an investigation pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section indicates a
failure to comply with this part, the responsible Department official or his designee will so inform the
recipient and the matter will be resolved by informal means whenever possible.”).
136. Procedure for Effective Compliance, 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(c).
137. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(d).
138. Remedial and Affirmative Action and Self-Evaluation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a); Gebser, 524
U.S. at 288.
139. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 518
(1982)).
140. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–89.
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programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures.” 141 As such,
the Court concluded that “[w]here a statute’s express enforcement scheme
hinges its most severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain
compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the intention to have implied an
enforcement scheme that allows imposition of greater liability without
comparable conditions.” 142 Accordingly, the Court held that “a damages
remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in
the recipient’s programs and fails to adequately respond” by making an
official decision not to remedy the known violation. 143
Subsequently, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles by holding that a suit for private
damages may lie against a school in cases of student-on-student sexual
harassment only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference
to known acts of harassment that are so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive as to effectively bar a victim’s access to an educational opportunity
or benefit. 144 The Court again noted that Title IX was enacted by Congress
pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause and that “there can, of course,
be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if a State is
unaware of the conditions imposed by the legislation or is unable to ascertain
what is expected of it.” 145 In concluding that a funding recipient can be liable
for an official decision not to remedy a known violation where it “exercises
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known
harassment occurs,” 146 the Court reaffirmed the prerequisites of actual
knowledge and conduct amounting to deliberate indifference in stating a claim
for money damages under Title IX. 147
Indeed, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of actual
knowledge of Title IX violations in holding that a funding recipient could be
liable for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX
for retaliating against a person that complains of sex discrimination.148
Specifically, the Court stressed that Title IX’s enforcement scheme “depends

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 289.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 290.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 650.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174, 181.
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on individual reporting because individuals and agencies may not bring suit
under the statute unless the recipient has received ‘actual notice’ of the
Accordingly, protection from retaliation for such
discrimination.” 149
individual reporting is necessary to ensure that unlawful discrimination does
not go unremedied. 150 Further, the Court noted that, unlike other forms of
individual sexual discrimination or harassment, retaliatory conduct is easily
attributable to the funding recipient and is, by definition, intentional.151
II.

IS NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE REQUIRED?

While it is clearly established that there is a private right of action under
Title IX, that compensatory damages and injunctive relief are available
remedies to such a right, and that an appropriate official must have knowledge
of the alleged violation in claims of sexual harassment, the scope of the private
right of action and available remedies for claims arising out of systemic
ineffective accommodation has not been conclusively addressed.
Because the Supreme Court has held only that actual notice by appropriate
officials is required in sexual harassment cases, it is unclear whether and how
this standard should be applied in other types of cases brought under Title
IX. 152 Specifically, it is unclear whether notice and opportunity to cure is a
prerequisite to Title IX suits challenging an institution’s equal provision of
athletic opportunities. The three circuits to address this issue have reached
inconsistent conclusions.
A.

Pederson v. Louisiana State University

As the first federal appellate court to address the issue, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding in Gebser and Davis had “little
relevance” in determining whether the funding recipient in the case before it
had engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination.153 In Pederson, female
students attending Louisiana State University (LSU) challenged the
university’s provision of facilities and teams for intercollegiate athletic
competition. 154 The trial court concluded that LSU was in violation of Title
IX. Specifically, the court found that during the relevant time period, LSU’s

149. Id. at 181.
150. Id. at 180.
151. Id. at 183.
152. Cohen, supra note 22 (arguing that Gebser’s notice requirement should not apply to nonsexual harassment discrimination cases brought under Title IX).
153. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882.
154. Id. at 864.

YAP (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/8/2012 3:38 PM

PAY OR PLAY?

539

student population was approximately 51% male and 49% female and its
athletic participation for the same period was approximately 71% male and
29% female, despite demonstrated interest by female student-athletes for more
athletic opportunities. 155 Moreover, prior to verbally committing to add two
women’s intercollegiate varsity teams in 1993, LSU had added no new
women’s teams in fourteen years; rather, it had eliminated a successful
women’s intercollegiate varsity team in 1983 with no credible reason given.156
The court also found that LSU had not honored its commitment regarding the
addition of two new women’s teams. Furthermore, the court found that LSU
led a minority movement in the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) to resist changes toward gender equity in athletics within the NCAA.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that LSU had not effectively
accommodated female student-athletes and was therefore in violation of Title
IX. 157
However, the trial court also ruled that LSU was not liable for monetary
damages because it did not intentionally violate the statute.158 The court noted
that, although the question was a close one, the violations were not the result
of intentional discrimination, but rather of “arrogant ignorance, confusion
regarding the practical requirements of the law, and a remarkably outdated
view of women and athletics which created the byproduct of resistance to
change.” 159 The court found that LSU’s athletic director credibly believed
that the women’s athletic program was “wonderful” and that LSU’s disparate
treatment of women in athletics was based upon outdated assumptions of
women’s abilities. 160 The trial court also noted the confusion relating to Title
IX, both with respect to application and interpretation, since its enactment.161
As such, the trial court held that LSU, through the actions of its athletic
director, was “negligent in not adapting to the changing social and athletic
landscape,” but did not have the requisite intent to impose monetary damages
on the university. 162

155. The Pederson court found that there was ample evidence of interest in women’s fast-pitch
softball and soccer. Id. at 878. At trial, the plaintiffs established that (1) a number of current LSU
female students wanted to try out for fast-pitch softball or soccer; (2) well over 5,000 female high
school students were playing fast-pitch softball or soccer; and (3) many former members of a local
soccer club had received scholarships to play intercollegiate soccer. Id. at 868.
156. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915–16.
157. Id. at 916–17.
158. Id. at 918–21.
159. Id. at 918.
160. Id. at 919–20.
161. Id. at 919.
162. Id. at 921.
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In reversing the trial court’s ruling regarding liability for money damages,
the Fifth Circuit held that “the requirement in the sexual harassment cases—
that the academic institution have actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment—is not applicable for purposes of determining whether an
academic institution intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex by denying
females equal athletic opportunity” because in the latter circumstance “it is the
institution itself that is discriminating.”163 Because the Fifth Circuit found
that the record evidenced LSU’s intention to treat women differently on the
basis of their sex by offering them unequal athletic opportunity, it held that
LSU had intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex and was therefore
liable for money damages. 164
B.

Grandson v. University of Minnesota

Conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded that failure to provide an
education institution notice and a reasonable opportunity to rectify alleged
violations serves as a bar to private actions for monetary damages under Title
IX. 165 In Grandson, female students filed claims for injunctive relief against
the University of Minnesota following an investigation by OCR. OCR had
notified the university that a Title IX complaint, alleging ineffective
accommodation, unequal financial assistance, and unequal opportunities in
athletics, had been filed. Within the year, the university and OCR entered into
an agreement to resolve the complaint, which included increasing women’s
athletic opportunities, financial assistance, and support, as well as status
reports and administrative monitoring by OCR. 166 Two months prior to the
university’s entry into the agreement, individual plaintiffs brought suit for
injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and similarly situated female
students. 167 Subsequently—almost three months after the university had
entered into the agreement—the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their
complaint to assert claims for money damages. 168
In affirming the trial court’s denial of leave to amend, the Eighth Circuit
emphasized that the express remedy in Title IX “operates on an assumption of
prior notice of alleged discrimination to the funding recipient and an
opportunity to rectify any violation voluntarily.” 169 The court also noted that
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882.
Id.
Grandson, 272 F.3d at 575.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575.
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OCR’s three-part test provides flexible standards for compliance, and given
Gebser’s emphasis that money damages should not be awarded except for
knowing violations, claims from a specific Title IX violation require “prior
notice to a university official with authority to address the complaint and a
response demonstrating deliberate indifference to the alleged violation.” 170
C.

Mansourian v. Regents of the University of California

Finally, in the most recent case to address the issue, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the approach of the Fifth Circuit in concluding that Gebser’s
notice requirement is not applicable to university decisions with respect to
athletics. 171 In Mansourian, female student-athletes at the University of
California, Davis (UCD) who had participated on the men’s varsity wrestling
team brought suit after they were eliminated from the team when UCD
imposed roster caps on all the men’s teams to help aid in Title IX
compliance. 172 Prior to bringing suit, the women had filed a complaint with
OCR regarding their removal from the wrestling team; however, plaintiffs did
not file a claim with OCR or otherwise give UCD officials notice of a claim
arising from the alleged ineffective accommodation of women in the athletic
program at UCD. 173 During the course of the litigation, all of the plaintiffs
graduated from UCD; as such, there were no viable claims for injunctive
relief, only for money damages. 174 Rather, current female students filed a
separate class action suit for injunctive relief, and a settlement for broadranging injunctive relief was reached between the class and UCD. 175 The trial
court held that all plaintiffs’ claims arising from specific conduct relating to
the removal from and tryout policies for the men’s varsity wrestling team were
time-barred. 176 The trial court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ ineffective
accommodation claim must be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to give
UCD notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged violation of a universitywide failure to provide sufficient athletic opportunities for female studentathletes.
In reversing the trial court’s decision with respect to the notice

170. Id. at 576.
171. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968.
172. Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887.
173. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 962.
174. Id. at 962–63.
175. Stipulated Judgment and Order, Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 07-1488 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 19, 2009).
176. Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 2:03-cv-2591, 2007 WL 3046034, at
*5–*6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007).
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requirement, the Ninth Circuit noted that, unlike sexual harassment cases,
“[i]nstitutions, not individual actors, decide how to allocate resources between
male and female athletic teams” and that “[a]thletic programs that fail
effectively to accommodate students of both sexes thus represent ‘official
policy of the recipient entity’ and so are not covered by Gebser’s notice
requirement.” 177 Further, the court reasoned that “a judicially imposed notice
requirement would be superfluous in light of universities’ ongoing obligations
to certify compliance with Title IX’s athletics requirements and to track
athletics gender equity data.” 178 Rather, if in compliance with its statutory and
regulatory duties, a university should be aware of whether it is providing equal
athletic opportunities to women. As such, the Ninth Circuit “[joined] the Fifth
Circuit in holding that Gebser’s notice requirement is inapplicable to cases
alleging that a funding recipient has failed effectively to accommodate
women’s interest in athletics.” 179
III. NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE SHOULD BE REQUIRED IN SUITS
FOR MONEY DAMAGES BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ACCOMMODATION UNDER
TITLE IX
With respect to claims for money damages arising out the alleged systemic
ineffective accommodation of opportunities for female student-athletes, notice
to the educational institution of the alleged claim as well as an opportunity to
cure should be a prerequisite to suit. Notice and an opportunity to cure is most
consistent with statutory construction principles applied to implied private
rights of action in Spending Clause legislation. Moreover, such a requirement
is sound policy, both in promoting the equal treatment of female students in
athletics and limiting educational institutions’ exposure to monetary liability if
they voluntarily correct violations brought to their attention.
A. Notice and an Opportunity to Cure is Supported by Statutory
Construction
Because the legitimacy of Congress’ Spending Clause authority is based
upon the knowing and voluntary agreement to the terms of the funding by the
recipient, an educational institution should be entitled to notice and an
opportunity to cure alleged violations of systemic ineffective accommodation
before being subjected to a suit for money damages. As discussed, supra, both
the private right of action and the availability of money damages under Title
177. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 969.
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IX have been judicially implied; the statute is silent with respect to the manner
and means that an educational institution should be held liable for private
suits. Indeed, the Gebser Court expressly noted the latitude it had to shape a
sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the statute.180 Accordingly,
in determining the manner and means that an institution may be exposed to
broad monetary liability to approximately half of its student population and
recent graduates, the guiding principle should be the statute itself and its
supporting regulatory scheme. 181
As an initial matter, one of the dual purposes of Title IX is to provide
individual citizens effective protection against discriminatory practices in
education on the basis of gender. 182 This purpose is most clearly served by
remedies that actually end the discrimination, which come in the form of
injunctive and other equitable relief.183 Because the focus of Title IX is the
protection of individuals from discriminatory practices, not the compensation
of victims of discrimination, courts should be wary of interpreting the statute
in a way that unnecessarily exposes educational institutions to excessive
monetary liability. 184
The express regulatory means of enforcement and its focus on voluntary
compliance militates in favor of a notice requirement in suits for money
damages. 185 Notice and an attempt to secure voluntary compliance is a
prerequisite to agency enforcement proceedings. 186 The statutory and
regulatory language repeatedly emphasizes the primary goal of achieving
voluntary compliance by the recipient entity. 187 These provisions are
expressly aimed at ensuring compliance in a recipient’s programs,188
180. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
181. See id.
182. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–05.
183. The Cannon Court expressly contemplated relief aimed at remedying the alleged
discriminatory situation. Id. at 705 (“In that situation, the violation might be remedied more
efficiently by an order requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly
excluded.”). In examining the legislative history, the Court specifically noted that none of the
comments evidenced “any hostility toward an implied private remedy to terminate the offending
discrimination.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
184. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86. In Gebser, the Court rejected the possibility of unlimited
recovery of damages under Title IX. The Court noted that when Congress made damages available
under Title VII in 1991, it carefully limited the amount of damages in each individual case. The
Court concluded that it would be incongruous to allow greater recovery under Title IX, where
Congress had not spoken at all on the issue of damages and where, unlike Title VII, the focus of the
statute was on protection of individuals, not compensation. Id.
185. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.
186. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.
187. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
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practices, and policies. 189 Under Spending Clause principles, the terms of the
“contract” put a funding recipient on notice only that it is subject to potential
financial consequences after the institution was made aware of the complaints
against it and given a reasonable opportunity to respond. 190 Therefore, it is
not only “unsound” but also contrary to principles of statutory interpretation,
“for a statute’s express system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient
and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a judicially
implied system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to
the recipient’s knowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.” 191
Importing the safeguards set forth in the express enforcement system into
the judicially implied enforcement scheme is particularly important in claims
for money damages where recovery could exceed the level of federal
funding. 192 In a claim for ineffective accommodation, any female studentathlete currently attending the institution, as well as those who graduated
within the relevant statute of limitations, would have standing to bring suit for
money damages if their sport of choice was not offered at the varsity level,
regardless of their skill level.193 To establish the requisite standing, a plaintiff
need only demonstrate that she is or was “able and ready to compete for a
position on the unfielded team.” 194 Further, because these damages claims, by
definition, do not seek the actual fielding of the athletic team, plaintiffs who
are no longer students and who are ineligible to compete may be compensated
for past violations, thus increasing the number of potential plaintiffs. Potential
damages may include the value of lost scholarship opportunities, educational
services provided to varsity athletes, and other benefits received by varsity
athletes, as well as any actual injury suffered as a result of the failure to
provide opportunities. Moreover, it is possible that recovery could be
attempted as a class. 195 Accordingly, it is probable that the amount of
189. 34 CFR § 100.7.
190. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (“The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into
compliance.”).
191. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
192. See id. at 289–90.
193. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 871. In order to have standing, the potential plaintiffs would also
likely need to demonstrate eligibility. See id.
194. Id. at 871.
195. Where the injury alleged is the systemic deprivation of athletic opportunities due to unequal
and illegal funding decisions, the questions of programmatic liability would likely be common across
a class of current and former female students; it would be only the measurement of damages that
might differ among the members of the class. However, individualized damage calculations, alone,
may not defeat class treatment. See Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094
(9th Cir. 2010).
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damages arising out of an ineffective accommodation claim could exceed a
recipient’s level of federal funding. 196 The Court has noted that “[w]here a
statute’s express enforcement scheme hinges its most severe sanction on
notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliance, we cannot attribute to
Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows
imposition of greater liability without comparable conditions.”197 As such,
requiring notice and an opportunity to cure prior to filing a lawsuit for money
damages is both consistent with and supported by the express enforcement
mechanism. 198
The flexible nature of the regulatory compliance framework further
supports the need for notice in claims arising out of alleged ineffective
accommodation. While Title IX’s mandate against discrimination on the basis
of gender is clear, the application of that mandate to athletic programs is far
from it. Courts have routinely relied on the three-part test set forth in the 1979
Interpretation in determining programmatic compliance with Title IX.
However, OCR has emphasized that compliance with the three-part test is
itself “case- and fact- specific.” 199 And, there is sparse statutory, regulatory,
or judicial guidance with respect to these factors. 200
For example, under the first prong of the three-part test, a university may
demonstrate compliance by showing that “intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments.”201 However, there
is no authoritative guidance regarding what percentage disparity constitutes
“substantial proportionality.” A number of nonauthoritative sources refer to
narrowing proportionality to a 5% disparity as sufficient to satisfy prong
one. 202 This calculation ignores the actual number of students enrolled as well

196. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
197. Id. at 290.
198. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289–90 (analyzing the method of agency enforcement in
determining whether Congress intended to create privately enforceable rights).
199. 1996 Clarification, supra note 56.
200. See generally Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 61 (2001) (“[T]he courts have not yet explicitly articulated the
theory of equality that does underlie the three-part test, nor have they fully explored its implications.
Court decisions adopting the three-part test have not looked beyond the disparities in participation
opportunities to more fully understand the relationship between how sport programs are structured
and the shaping of men’s and women’s interest in sport.”); See Jerry R. Parkinson, Grappling with
Gender Equity, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (1996) (noting that despite a handful of cases and
OCR guidance, the law surrounding compliance with the three-part test is still unclear).
201. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.
202. In 1993, the California State University System entered into a settlement by which it agreed
that each campus with an NCAA athletic program would raise the level of female athletic
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as the number of athletic opportunities. On the opposite end of the spectrum,
other nonauthoritative sources assert that an institution cannot achieve
substantial proportionality unless the number of underrepresented athletes is
insufficient to field a varsity athletic team. 203 This formulation would seem to
be highly problematic if one undertakes to include sports that focus on the
individual, such as swimming, track and field, and gymnastics, where a “team”
can theoretically be fielded with a small number of athletes. 204
Similarly, under the second prong of the three-part test, a university may
demonstrate compliance by showing “a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities of the members” of the underrepresented class.205 As
with prong one, there is little to no authoritative guidance as to what
constitutes a sufficient history and continuing practice of program expansion
under prong two. While the 1996 Clarification provides a number of
illustrative examples, it does not provide any hard and fast rules for
determining compliance.206 Indeed, the 1996 Clarification allows for the
possibility of satisfying prong two even if an institution eliminates a team for
the underrepresented sex. 207 Further, it is unclear how many opportunities
must be added within what period of time in order to demonstrate a history
and continuing practice of program expansion. 208
Under this less than lucid compliance regime, it is not outside the realm of
reasonableness for an institution to not be fully aware of its compliance status
regarding effective accommodation. As such, the imposition of a notice

participation to within 5% of female undergraduate enrollment within five years. See Robert C.
Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 993, 1041–42 (1995).
203. Both Dr. Donna Lopiano and Dr. Christine Grants, nationally and internationally recognized
experts in Title IX, have testified that “substantial proportionality” is reached if the gap between the
percentage of female enrollment and the percentage of female participation opportunities is less than
the size of a female sports team that could be added. Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *13.
204. Id. at *13 n.17 (“However, the court has some misgivings about the practical application of
such a test, particularly in combination with plaintiffs’ concurrent advancement of the ‘team of one’
theory. Under plaintiff’s combined theories, to the extent an institution has not added a team where
individual competition is possible, such as swimming, indoor track & field, outdoor track & field,
cross-country, fencing, or wrestling, that institution would not be ‘substantially’ proportionate if the
participation gap was equal to one student who was interested in participating in such a sport.”).
205. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.
206. 1996 Clarification, supra note 56 (setting forth four examples intended to illustrate the
principles underlying Prong Two).
207. Id.
208. Id. (“There are no fixed intervals of time within which an institution must have added
participation opportunities.”); Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *14–15 (recounting the testimony
of Dr. Grant, the defendants’ expert, that an institution must expand every two to three years to rely
on prong two and that an institution should be given a “credit” for adding a number of teams at once).

YAP (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/8/2012 3:38 PM

PAY OR PLAY?

547

requirement for an alleged ineffective accommodation violation would
encourage institutions to undertake a robust inquiry into their compliance plan
in order to avoid potentially expansive monetary liability.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit’s focus on intent is misplaced under the
statutory and regulatory framework applicable to ineffective accommodation
claims. Intentional conduct in this context is different from intentional
conduct in sexual harassment or retaliation claims. In those cases, the focus is
on an individual actor who makes a knowing and voluntary decision to engage
In effective
in discriminatory conduct that violates Title IX. 209
accommodation, the decision at issue is one made by an educational
institution, and in most circumstances, a decision not made by one individual
unilaterally. 210 Further, given that these are challenges to an institution’s
athletic program, in most cases, the violation likely does not arise from one
decision, but rather a series of decisions that impact numerous institutional
policies, interests, and goals.211 Therefore, what the offending conduct is,
who engaged in the offending conduct, and whether that person intended to
engage in such conduct is a much more amorphous inquiry in a programmatic
challenge than it is in a challenge arising out of a clearly identifiable actor’s
discrete acts. 212
Moreover, the expansive conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit runs
directly counter to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gebser. Under the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, notice and an opportunity to cure would never
209. See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277 (whether a school district can be held liable for the
independent misconduct of a teacher); Davis, 526 U.S. at 639 (whether a school district can be held
liable for the misconduct of other students); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171 (whether a school district can be
held liable for its retaliatory conduct against a person who complains of sex discrimination).
210. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968 (“Institutions, not individual actors, decide how to allocate
resources between male and female athletic teams.”).
211. Id. (“Decisions to create or eliminate teams or to add or decrease roster slots for male or
female athletes are official decisions, not practices by individual students or staff.”).
212. Critics of the imposition of notice argue that “[b]ecause schools create sex-segregated teams
at the outset, they make a gender-conscious allocation of opportunities in the first instance.” Samuels
& Galles, supra note 6, at 26. Theoretically, a school’s yearly funding decisions could constitute
affirmative discriminatory conduct by the institution. However, this characterization ignores the
practical difficulties identifying and correcting gender inequities. For example, the number of
available athletes may fluctuate based upon incoming or graduating talent; the need for more female
athletic opportunities may significantly increase due to a significant increase in the female
undergraduate population; or the addition of a new varsity sport for women may take time to
implement. See Epstein, supra note 16 (noting the impediments to Title IX compliance “now that
women constitute over 57 percent of all college students” because the number of spots on women’s
teams does not increase with enrollment just as the number of spots on men’s teams does not decrease
with diminishing enrollment). Accordingly, while such circumstances would not excuse a Title IX
violation, they do render problematic a clear identification of official intent for purposes of claims for
money damages.
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be required in ineffective accommodation cases because “[a]thletic programs
that fail effectively to accommodate students of both sexes thus represent
‘official policy of the recipient entity’ and so are not covered by Gebser’s
notice requirement.” 213 However, the Gebser Court expressly recognized that
the administrative enforcement mechanism was designed for a recipient that
“was unaware of discrimination in its program[].” 214 Because the express
enforcement scheme, which includes notice and an opportunity to cure, was
purposefully aimed at remedying programmatic challenges, it is inconsistent
with the statutory and regulatory scheme to wholly exclude private challenges
to an institution’s program from a notice requirement. Further, the Gebser
Court also noted that imposing a notice requirement in private suits served the
central purpose of the notice requirement in the agency enforcement scheme,
namely, “to avoid diverting education funding from beneficial uses where a
recipient was unaware of discrimination in its programs and is willing to
institute prompt corrective measures.”215 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
wholly ignores this aim.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that an institution could not be
legitimately unaware of the unequal provision of athletic opportunities in its
athletic program is belied by the flexible nature of Title IX compliance.216
Indeed, Mansourian demonstrates that the question of compliance is not so
easily answered. In Mansourian, two Title IX experts, both of whom were
involved in the evolution of Title IX and its regulations and both of whom had
previously testified only on behalf of the underrepresented sex in Title IX
cases, disagreed about whether the university had sufficiently complied with
prong two of the three-part test. 217 Based upon the same history and the same
official reports, the experts reached two different conclusions regarding
whether the university had a history and continuing practice of program
expansion. 218 Accordingly, because of the flexible standards relating to Title
IX compliance, as well as the ambiguity surrounding those already flexible
standards, it is even more important that a university official with authority to
address the complaint has notice of the specific basis for the claim and an
213. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968; see also Heckman, supra note 55, at 232 (“With traditional
Title IX athletics claims of sex discrimination, it is submitted that any prerequisite notice provision
should, if required, be deemed satisfied as therein the actions of the athletic department—as carried
out by the athletic directors or coaches—represent the official policy of that educational institution.”).
214. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 289.
216. Moreover, the Gebser Court expressly held that “failure to comply with the regulations does
not establish the requisite actual notice and deliberate indifference.” Id. at 291–92.
217. Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *12–15.
218. Id.
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opportunity to respond. 219
B. Notice and an Opportunity to Cure is Sound Policy
Beyond being supported by cannons of statutory interpretation and by
judicial precedent, notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money
damages based on ineffective accommodation claims is sound policy that
furthers the goals and considerations underlying Title IX.
Notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money damages furthers
the antidiscrimination goals of Title IX while also avoiding the diversion of
educational funds away from beneficial uses. The threat of potentially
expansive financial hardship as a result of failure to respond to a complaint of
ineffective accommodation is likely a sufficient incentive for a funding
recipient to take a close look at its athletic program and take voluntary action
to bring itself into compliance. If an institution voluntarily complies, it
ensures that educational funds are actually being used to provide athletic
opportunities for the underrepresented gender, not to fund damages claims by
students or former students who may not have the skill to compete at a varsity
level or who may have already graduated from the institution. This also serves
Title IX’s focus on protection as opposed to compensation.
Further, given the expansive nature of potential Title IX liability, it is
important that an educational institution has notice of the specific violation at
the base of the complaint. As noted supra, the question of what constitutes
ineffective accommodation itself is not a clear-cut inquiry. Moreover, while
ineffective accommodation claims constitute one category of Title IX
violations, there are a number of different potential types of programmatic
challenges arising out of alleged unequal treatment. In order for an institution
to have a reasonable opportunity to voluntarily remediate an actual violation, it
needs to be on notice of the specific violation at issue. For example, in
Mansourian, the plaintiffs had never advised the university that they were
claiming violations based upon alleged ineffective accommodation violations
prior to bringing suit. 220 Rather, they had filed complaints about the
219. See Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576.
These are flexible standards, and Gebser emphasized that money damages should not be
awarded except for knowing violations. When an individual plaintiff such as Grandson
claims money damages from a specific Title IX violation . . . Gebser requires prior notice
to a university official with authority to address the complaint and a response
demonstrating deliberate indifference to the alleged violation.”

Id.
220. Indeed, the district court noted that it was not clear until oral argument on the defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings, almost four years after the case was filed, that the plaintiffs
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elimination of wrestling opportunities for women on the men’s varsity
wrestling team. 221 It was not until four years into the litigation that it became
clear that the plaintiffs were launching a challenge against the number of
female opportunities in the entire athletic program, not just alleged inequities
in the wrestling program. 222 However, despite this belated clarification to
both the university and the court, 223 under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the
plaintiffs were entitled to press their broad, systemic claims for money
damages without any opportunity for the university to enter into a voluntary
compliance plan. 224 Given that the university subsequently entered into a
class settlement for expansive injunctive relief that would eventually bring the
university into compliance under prong one, 225 the litigation is an example of
the unnecessary expenditure of sparse funds both with respect to the cost of
litigation itself as well as any potential money damages.
Conversely, the facts of Grandson exemplify how the system is supposed
to work, honoring the importance of ensuring equal opportunities in athletics
in addition to the fiscal constraints of most universities. In Grandson, after a
complaint was filed with OCR, the university entered into a voluntary
agreement to increase athletic opportunities for women. In approximately
three years, the university had fully implemented all provisions of the
agreement. Accordingly, the goals of Title IX were served without imposing
additional monetary obligations on the university in the form of money
damages. As such, from both a legal and policy perspective, the Eighth
Circuit appropriately upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for money
damages based upon the failure to give the university notice and an
opportunity to cure.
Moreover, notice and an opportunity to cure as a prerequisite to suits for
money damages would increase public confidence in the implementation of
Title IX. In times of tight budget conditions, where athletic programs are
already strained to continue providing existing athletic opportunities as well as
were filing an ineffective accommodation claim under Title IX. Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents, 617
F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
221. Id. at 1019 n.7 (noting that the plaintiffs’ complaints to the defendants and OCR did not set
forth an ineffective accommodation claim with respect to either the university’s wrestling program
specifically or its athletic program generally, but rather alleged unequal treatment of female
wrestlers).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 966–68.
225. Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 07-1488 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); Title IX
Settlement Leads to Stricter 1.5 % Compliance Standard, UNIV. OF HA., MANOA, OFFICE OF THE C.INSTITUTIONAL RES. (June 22, 2009), available at http://ovcaa-iro.org/support_bulletin/2009/20091.pdf.
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to add more opportunities for female students,226 it is not hard to assume that a
monetary windfall to female students, including those who have already
graduated from the offending institution, would not be favorably received by
the general public. While everyone would prefer that educational institutions
achieve the equality mandated by Title IX by increasing opportunities for
female student-athletes to match those long-enjoyed by male student-athletes,
schools with financial constraints cannot always do this. 227 Even when the
athletic budget pie gets smaller, both male and female athletes still deserve and
are legally entitled to an equal slice.228 However, it serves neither Title IX’s
policies nor the interests of any student-athlete when that pie is further
diminished by money damages for a violation that an institution is willing to
correct.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is beyond dispute that the opportunity to participate in collegiate
athletics brings with it unparalleled experiences that educate and serve a
student-athlete long after graduation. Title IX legislatively mandates the
sound policy that men and women should be given equal opportunities to
participate in such experiences. Litigation brought under Title IX can help
ensure that educational institutions are honoring their agreements to provide
such equal opportunities, particularly where the remedy sought is declaratory
or injunctive in nature.229
226. When the original implementing regulations were before Congress, Representative Patsy
Mink acknowledged the tension between men’s major and minor sports and women’s sports,
particularly during times of tight institutional and athletic budgets. However, she concluded that such
tension did not justify the continued denial of equal opportunities and benefits to female studentathletes. Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 22 (citing Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings
Before the H. Subcomm. on Post-Secondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 166
(1975) (statement of Rep. Mink)). However, there was no mention of the balance between resources
devoted to implementing programmatic change and those diverted to money damages at these
congressional hearings.
227. See Epstein, supra note 16 (“In hard times, budget dollars are still scarcer, so the pressure to
cut men’s teams becomes even greater. That pressure hits minor sports harder because of the large
number of spots that colleges have to reserve for football.”); Starace, supra note 7; Susan M. Shook,
Note, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990’s: Nonrevenue Men’s Teams
Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L. J. 773, 793–96 (1996); see also Samuels
& Galles, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that Title IX does not dictate an institution’s funding choices and
“is not the cause of these schools’ decision-making”).
228. See Title IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports: A False Conflict, supra note 11, at 5 (“Title IX
simply ensures that it can no longer be the women who suffer cuts, second-class treatment, and the
brunt of limited resources.”); Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 31 (“[Title IX] merely requires that
[institutions] equitably allocate the opportunities and resources that they have.”).
229. The author again notes that requiring notice and an opportunity to cure in suits for
injunctive relief are not supported by the same arguments that apply to imposing such a requirement
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However, requiring notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money
damages is neither a barrier nor an impediment 230 to implementation of the
policies advanced by Title IX. It is a means of ensuring that valuable
resources are directed at remedying inequities in the provision of athletic
opportunities. Where an institution knowingly fails to correct violations after
being alerted of them, a plaintiff may pursue any and all remedies, including
money damages. But, to the extent that an institution is willing to voluntarily
cure its own violations, it should be given the opportunity to do so, and thus
provide as many opportunities as possible. In a choice between institutional
compliance and post-harm compensation, compliance should be the paramount
interest.

in suits for money damages.
230. Heckman, supra note 55, at 232 (“The thirty-year history of individuals seeking redress for
claims of Title IX sex discrimination within athletic departments is one replete with legal minefields
placed along the way . . . . [W]hether the judiciary will require a condition precedent notice
requirement in order to pursue a regular Title IX athletics case just represents another uphill climb in
the long race to achieve gender equity in the nation’s schools.”).

